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Our schools are becoming more socially
segregated. The life chances of children
from poor families are lower nowadays.
Immigrants are threatening the jobs 
of British-born workers. Blunt assertions
of this kind are commonplace 
in the language of politicians and
commentators from across the political
spectrum. But how true are any of
these claims? Which ones reflect reality
and which are myths?
The answers can only come from
taking a proper look at the evidence.
Much of the work of researchers at the
Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)
aims to do just that, gathering data
across a wide range of social phenomena
and rigorously applying the tools of
economic analysis to see what we can
learn about such pressing policy concerns
as education, inequality and immigration.
An underlying theme in this
CentrePiece is the value of research
evidence for informing public debate.
For example, on whether high- and low-
achieving children are being educated
in separate schools, Stephen Gibbons
and Shqiponja Telhaj find that there is
strong segregation by ability but it does
not appear to be increasing over time.
And Marco Manacorda and colleagues
find that while immigration does have
some labour market effects, they seem
to be on the wages of earlier migrants.
On intergenerational mobility, a
series of CEP studies has revealed that it
has indeed fallen between the cohort
of British children who grew up in the
1960s and early 1970s and those who
grew up in the 1970s and 1980s. But we
still know little about changes since
then or what has happened in other
countries. Here, Maia Güell and
colleagues explain a new technique 
for measuring the importance of family
background for people’s outcomes in
later life.
One area in which it is particularly
common to hear bold statements
unencumbered by evidence is the
impact of computers. Information
technology has led to the ‘death of
distance’, various pundits have asserted.
Computers may be in every workplace
but they’ve failed to make us more
productive, argue others.
Three studies reported here touch
on these issues. One uses patent
citations to see if innovations are
flowing more quickly between
countries. Another examines whether
the rise in inequality is linked to 
firms’ use of new technology. And the
third investigates whether computers
have helped US police departments to
fight crime.
As always, your feedback on
CentrePiece is welcome. And look out
for other CEP efforts to summarise the
latest research evidence in the policy
analyses available on our website:
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/_new/publications/
series.asp?prog=CEPPA
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Editor
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E
xpansion of choice has
become a central theme
of recent educational
policy debates in
England and
internationally. Some
argue that freedom of choice ensures 
that pupils and schools are efficiently
matched, and that ‘quasi-market’
discipline induced by open competition for
pupils encourages schools to adopt more
efficient teaching methods. 
Others point to the possibly adverse
consequences of a more ‘segregated’
school system, in which pupils are less
likely to mix with children unlike
themselves in terms of background and
ability. According to these arguments,
more choice is bad – either because
segregation seems to imply inequality and
is inherently socially undesirable; or
because it is claimed that a segregated
school system is educationally inefficient.
Setting aside broad and subjective
arguments over the desirability of ethnic
and social mixing, the most compelling
cause for concern is that the separation of
pupils into academically advantaged and
disadvantaged groups may work to
exacerbate inequalities in educational
outcomes without producing any 
overall benefits.
This can occur if children are
influenced by the achievements and
behaviour of their schoolmates – so-called
‘peer group’ effects – or simply because
disadvantaged pupils place greater
pressure on teaching resources and so
harm the chances of others in their
classroom or school.
These issues have become highly
relevant in the light of policies that seek to
expand parental choice, and our research
has sought some answers to the key
questions: what is the extent of
educational segregation? Are the patterns
changing? What are the implications for
individual pupils in terms of their
achievements? And what contribution
does this make to educational inequality? 
Are secondary school pupils
educationally segregated?
Most of the debate about school
segregation (and hence much previous
research) has been concerned with
demographic and socio-economic
characteristics. Relatively little attention
has been paid to the important issue of
segregation that is explicitly along lines of
educational advantage and disadvantage –
presumably the key concern to those
worried about inequality in education. For
parents too, the real consideration seems
to be the stratification along lines of pupil
‘ability’ or capacity to achieve.
In the first part of our research, we
look explicitly at the extent to which high-
achieving and low-achieving pupils are
separated into and educated in different
secondary schools – and how this changed
between 1996 and 2002. We do this by
examining differences in the composition
of secondary state schools in terms of the
academic achievements of pupils at the
time they start school.
The analysis is based on pupils’ results
in their maths, science and English key
stage 2 tests at the age of 11, the end of
primary school, coupled with information
on which secondary schools they move 
on to. These data are collected for nearly
all state school pupils, so we can study
what is happening for almost all schools
and almost the entire population of pupils
in England.
What is the best way to analyse
differences in the composition of schools?
Previous research has typically used various
segregation or inequality indices – single
numbers that summarise the level of
inequality at a particular point in time –
but we adopt a more graphical approach.
Imagine ranking all pupils entering
secondary schools in increasing order of
their test scores at age 11. Pupils in the
top 1% receive a score of 100, those in the
bottom 1% receive a score of 1 and those
in the middle a score of 50, and so on. For
each secondary school, we can calculate
the position in that ranking of the average
pupil, a score that summarises the average
intake ability in each school.
Then, with these average school scores,
we can rank schools in the same way. 
The 1% of schools receiving the lowest-
achieving average pupil get a score 
of 1 and the 1% with the highest-achieving
average pupil gets a score of 100, and 
so on.
Plotting each school’s average pupil
ranking against its own ranking in the
distribution of schools provides a fairly
complete visual description of the way in
which pupils with different prior
achievements are segregated into different
secondary schools. If there were very little
segregation, then there would be very little
To what extent are high-achieving and 
low-achieving pupils in England separated into 
and educated in different secondary schools?
Research by Stephen Gibbons and 
Shqiponja Telhaj looks at patterns of
segregation by ability and their impact on
educational outcomes.
The average ability of
children going into the
best comprehensive
schools is way above
the average ability in
the worst 
difference between the achievement of the
average pupil as we move from the worst
to the best schools, and the plot would
tend towards the horizontal. As pupils
become segregated along lines of ability,
the plot steepens towards a 45-degree
slope with the top 1% of pupils in the top
1% of schools and the bottom 1% of
pupils in the bottom 1% of schools.
Figure 1 shows the picture for London
for three years: 1996, 1999 and 2002. The
top panel shows comprehensive schools
only, while the lower panel shows all
schools, including religious schools and
grammar schools. For comparison, we also
draw the 45-degree line that represents a
hypothetical school system in which pupils
are completely segregated according to
their prior achievement.
It is clear that even for comprehensive
schools, there is quite strong segregation by
ability. The gap between the average pupil
in the highest-ranking school and the
average pupil in the lowest-ranking school
spans almost one-third of the distribution
of pupil achievement. In other words, the
average pupil in the bottom school is in the
bottom third of pupils ranked by test scores
at age 11, while the average pupil in the
top school is in the top third. In the bottom
panel, which adds in other types of schools,
the differences are even more pronounced.
What drives differences
between school intakes?
Our analysis does not answer this question
directly. But since comprehensive schools
have no scope to choose pupils, these
patterns are most likely to arise because
these schools serve local neighbourhoods
and different neighbourhoods contain
pupils from very different socio-economic
backgrounds. All the children in a rich
neighbourhood go to school together, and
all the children in a poor neighbourhood go
to school together. Such differences arise
not because of the freedom for parents and
pupils to choose schools, but because of a
lack of choice given where a pupil lives.
In contrast, some segregation could
also arise because the highest-ability
children are free to choose the same
schools as other higher-ability children
wherever they live – the story of self-
selection that underpins the critique that
school choice generates inequalities. This
consequence of school choice is illustrated
by the bottom panel: educational
segregation is even greater when we
include schools that can ‘cream skim’ pupils
by picking according to ability or have other
attributes – such as religious ethos – that
make them likely to attract or choose pupils
of different types and abilities.
Whatever the causes of educational
segregation, a striking feature of Figure 1
is that there has been almost no change in
recent years. Comparing the lines for 1996
to 2002 shows that almost nothing has
changed over these years in terms of the
way that pupils of different abilities are
sorted into different schools. The picture
in other regions of England is invariably
the same: there are wide inequalities in
intake between schools, but there has
been no systematic change over the
period of our analysis.
Other approaches to the question
produce similar answers: for example,
there are no regions in which the
proportion of schools accommodating
pupils with abilities among the top 5% is
less in 2002 than in 1996, or where the
proportion of schools accommodating
pupils from the bottom 5% has
decreased. In fact, our findings suggest
that the general trend is towards a more
CentrePiece Winter 2007/08
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Figure 1:
Segregation by achievement in secondary school 
intakes in London
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research, we find that any contribution that
peer groups make to a child’s academic
progress is quite small: a move from the
worst to the best comprehensive school (in
terms of the intake ranking in Figure 1)
would make only a slight difference to how
well a child progressed in the first few years
of secondary school. It seems unlikely that
the balance of educational success or
failure will be tipped according to whether
a child attends a school alongside high- or
low-ability children.
This claim might seem puzzling given
that parents seem to make great efforts to
find schools with good peer groups. But
better peer groups may provide other
benefits – physical safety, emotional
security, familiarity, lifetime friendship
networks or simply exclusivity – which
makes schools with good peer groups very
desirable, even if they offer only slight
academic advantages. Perhaps it is here
that individuals really win or lose out
through both socio-economic and
achievement-based school segregation.
even distribution of these groups 
across schools.
So overall, we do not find any dramatic
or systematic changes in school
composition in terms of the abilities of
pupil intakes. This is an important result as
it runs counter to the tales of increased
stratification and segregation that are
commonplace in academic, media and
political circles. The idea that pupils of high-
and low-ability have become increasingly
segregated seems to be something of a
myth, at least in recent years.
But there are large and stable
differences in intake between schools of
the same general type even if they have
little autonomy in control of pupil
admissions: the average ability of pupils
going into the ‘best’ comprehensive schools
is way above the average ability in the
worst. It is surely this fundamental contrast
– driven for the most part by geographical
disparities in pupil background arising from
residential segregation – that drives
perceptions of inequity in school provision
and of failings in the system. 
Does segregation matter?
Whether the patterns of segregation that
we find are cause for concern depends in
part on whether such segregation is
considered socially desirable, but also on
whether peer group ability has any real
impact on individual pupils. Anecdotally,
schools often seem to be judged and
chosen by parents on the basis of the kind
of children they enrol, rather than the
quality of their teaching or other facilities. 
So do parents’ apparent preferences
mean that peer groups have a big impact
on how well a child does at school and in
later life? Certainly, pupils in schools with
low-achieving peers are more likely to do
badly later on, and pupils in schools
surrounded by high-achievers are more
likely to do well. But is this just because
high-ability pupils tend to go to schools
with other high-ability pupils and low-ability
pupils go to schools with other low-ability
pupils? Or does our peer group really
matter for our own success?
Answers to these questions are
important for a number of reasons. First, if
peer groups matter, then a segregated
school system means that children could be
disadvantaged by the school they attend,
even if teaching standards are as high there
as anywhere else. This could lead to
persistence or growth in inequality as the
lowest-achievers get the worst deal and
high-achievers the best deal in terms of
peer group quality. Whether, on balance,
this inequality generates benefits or costs
for society depends on whether the
winners gain more than the losers – a
question underlying the familiar debate
about the benefits of streaming versus
mixing in schools.
Aside from these issues, it is worth
knowing if individual pupils respond to their
peers, because it can mean that
educational interventions that appear
beneficial to one pupil in isolation may be
even more effective when rolled out to the
whole population. This ‘social multiplier’
effect arises because an intervention, such
as a new teaching method, benefits a pupil
directly but also indirectly via its impact on
his or her schoolmates. 
Our evidence on these questions is
based on what happens to educational
trajectories when pupils move from primary
to secondary school and meet new
schoolmates. We use this change in peer
group quality to examine whether the
differences between school intake
illustrated in Figure 1 have any influence on
a pupil’s subsequent progress in tests up to
the age of 14.
We find that pupils do make better
progress in maths and English in the early
stages of secondary school if their new
schoolmates have a good record of prior
achievement. And it really is prior
achievement that seems to matter: other
factors, such as ethnic mix, age
composition and low-income schoolmates,
have no direct effects on a child’s progress.
This is encouraging because pupils’
prior attainments are surely more
amenable to early interventions than socio-
economic and demographic characteristics.
But it also means that the patterns of
segregation in secondary schools could
have real consequences in terms of
educational inequality.
Even so, in line with most previous
This article summarises ‘Peer Effects and
Pupil Attainment: Evidence from Secondary
School Transition’ by Stephen Gibbons and
Shqiponja Telhaj, Centre for the Economics of
Education (CEE) Discussion Paper No. 63
(http://cee.lse.ac.uk/cee%20dps/ceedp63.pdf)
and ‘Are Schools Drifting Apart? Intake
Stratification in English Secondary 
Schools’ by Stephen Gibbons and Shqiponja
Telhaj, CEE Discussion Paper No. 64
(http://cee.lse.ac.uk/cee%20dps/ceedp64.pdf).
Stephen Gibbons is a senior lecturer in
economic geography at LSE. Shqiponja
Telhaj is a lecturer in economics at the
University of Sussex. Both are research
associates in CEP’s education and skills
programme.
Patterns of segregation
in secondary schools
could have real
consequences in terms
of educational inequality

C
ommentators have for years
been claiming that
economic activity no longer
respects international
frontiers. But while cheap
communication, falling shipping costs and
the internet make things easier, face-to-
face interaction remains as important as
ever, even in high-tech sectors like
software and biotechnology – just think of
Silicon Valley or Bangalore. And if one
looks at trade patterns between countries,
international boundaries still matter a lot.
Our new research finds the first
evidence that distance really is dying – at
least in the world of ideas. Having looked
at over two million patent citations over a
quarter of a century and broken them
down by the country of the inventors
(covering just about every nation in the
world), we find that national barriers are
crumbling when it comes to the flow of
innovations, as measured by the relative
speed of patent citations across countries.
We find that there was a great deal of
‘home bias’ between 1975 and 1990: for
example, German inventors cited other
Germans 14% faster than American
inventors cited German patents. But the
really interesting thing is how these
citations have changed over time: since
1990, the Americans have been only 5%
slower at citing Germans than the
Germans themselves; and the French only
1% slower. So even though information is
spreading faster within countries, it has
also started to flow really quickly between
countries.
The importance of
geography
Economists dating back to Alfred Marshall
in the late nineteenth century have
emphasised the importance of
geographical proximity for the flow of
ideas and the diffusion of technologies.
Inventors find it hard to capture
knowledge: like water, it ‘spills over’ to
other people. Geographical proximity
facilitates this process if face-to-face
interaction is important, for example,
where knowledge is ‘tacit’ so that it is not
codified in writing or in standard industry
practices. Workers and managers meeting
at formal and informal meetings and
moving between firms will help to
transmit new ideas between
organisations.
The idea that closeness matters for
the diffusion of knowledge also lies
behind a number of government policies.
Subsidies for research and development
(R&D) generally target activities that are
geographically located within the home
country. These typically seek to attract
shiny high-tech firms to locate in specific
areas, based on the premise that their
activities will have the highest ‘positive
externalities’ – benefits not only for the
investors but also for firms and workers
nearby. Other policies aim to encourage
clusters of high-tech firms, based on the
belief that the sum of benefits from
CentrePiece Winter 2007/08
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Is distance 
dying at last?
When it comes to the
flow of new ideas,
distance is now dying
Economists have long been sceptical of claims about
the ‘death of distance’ – the idea that new technology
has diminished the significance of geography for
economic outcomes. Research by Rachel Griffith,
Sokbae Lee and John Van Reenen on patent
citations over time finds the first hard evidence that
distance is indeed becoming less important.
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innovations such as the internet. We use
patent citations to address whether the
rumours of the death of distance have
been somewhat exaggerated. In particular,
we look at the speed of knowledge flows
between countries.
A simple look at the raw data suggests
substantial evidence of home bias in the
way that knowledge is transmitted: being
geographically close does make
knowledge transfer easier. But we also see
evidence that distance has become less
important over time for the international
transmission of ideas. 
Figure 1 plots the relative speed of
patent citations across countries and over
clusters of firms is greater than the
constituent parts. 
In contrast to the idea that
geographical proximity is important for
technology transfer, the notion of the
‘death of distance’ has recently flourished
in the popular imagination (for example,
Friedman, 2005; Cairncross, 1997; Coyle,
1997). Messiahs of globalisation claim
that information travels around the globe
at rapid speed from California to Calcutta
through the internet, conferences,
telephone and other communication
devices. Under this view, geography plays
little role.
There are plenty of anecdotes, but
what is the hard evidence that distance
matters? And to what extent have they
changed over time?
Existing research:
distance matters
Answering these questions turns out to
be difficult for a number of reasons. First,
how do we trace knowledge flows? And
second, how can we distinguish the
importance of geographical proximity for
knowledge flows from other factors that
may be associated with geography? 
Patent citations have become an
important source of information on the
way that knowledge flows between firms
and countries. When an inventor takes
out a patent, they have to provide
citations to the prior technology 
from which their ideas are drawn. 
This is a pretty direct measure of
knowledge flows.
One prominent study that uses patent
citations in this way is by Adam Jaffe and
colleagues (1993). They show that
inventors are far more likely to cite other
inventors living close by than inventors in
more distant locations.
Several studies have followed this
approach, and the consensus that has
emerged is that knowledge really is
subject to a significant degree of home
bias. Our earlier study (Griffith et al,
2006) also shows that British firms who
locate R&D labs in the United States are
better able to tap into American
knowledge than those that do not. 
New research:
distance starting to die
But much of this research uses older data.
Our latest study aims to establish whether
things have changed recently with
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Figure 1:
Distance matters less for the flow of ideas
Innovations are
flowing more
quickly between
countries, as
measured by the
relative speed of
patent citations
over time
Speed of citation: Example of inventions from Germany
German cited patents
 Early (1975-1989)
 Late (1990-1999)
Notes: This graph shows the relative percentage time (in mean number of days) from the date
that a German inventor was granted a patent until the first citation of that patent (by the
location of the inventor that made the citation). For example, the first bar (blue) for France in the
early period indicates that the French inventor took 4% longer to cite a German invention than a
German inventor took to cite another German inventor. This fell to 1% in the 1990s (red bar).
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Figure 2:
Distance matters less for the flow of ideas
Speed of citation: All other countries
French cited patents
EU cited patents
UK cited patents
Japanese cited patents
US cited patents
 Early (1975-1989)
 Late (1990-1999)
Notes: As in Figure 1. Height of bar
indicates how much slower a country is in
citing another country.
time for the example of inventions
discovered in Germany. These are all
successful applications to the US Patent
Office for inventors living in Germany 
in an ‘early’ period (1975-89) on the left
and then in a ‘later’ period (1990-99) on
the right.
Looking first at the early period, the
height of each bar indicates how much
slower foreign inventors were in being first
to cite Germans relative to other German
inventors. In the 1970s and 1980s,
American inventors were about 14%
slower in citing Germans than the
Germans themselves. 
Figure 2 looks at inventions cited in
the other OECD countries. The fact that
the bars in both Figures 1 and 2 are
almost all positive suggests that the
phenomenon of home bias in ideas is alive
and well – Germans are quicker at citing
other Germans, British quicker at citing
other British, and so on. What is more
interesting is how home bias has changed
over time – on average the bars in the
later period are lower than the bars in the
earlier period. This suggests that home
bias in ideas has fallen. After 1990 in
Figure 1, the French are only about 1%
slower in citing Germans, and the
Americans only about 5% slower in citing
Germans inventors, than the Germans
themselves (only the British seem to be
slower off the block in citing Germans in
the 1990s!). 
This looks promising and suggests
distance is dying. But there are many
reasons why the simple patterns in the
raw data might be misleading. In
particular, knowledge may spread more or
less quickly due to many patent
characteristics that may be poorly
captured by observable characteristics, and
may be associated with geography. For
example, if high quality patents are cited
more quickly than lower quality patents,
and if high quality patents are
CentrePiece Winter 2007/08
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geographically clustered for some other
reason, then this could give the impression
of home bias whereas in fact it is to do
with the higher average quality of
inventors in one location. 
The traditional way to deal with this sort
of problem in econometric research is to
control for unobserved and correlated ‘fixed
effects’ (things which we don’t measure but
are pretty much fixed over time). Lee (2007)
develops an econometric estimator that
allows us to do this by taking ‘quasi-
differences’ over time between multiple
citations on the same patent.
Our research suggests that controlling
for these unobserved characteristics makes
an important difference to estimates of
the importance of home bias in innovative
activity:
 First, the evidence for home bias is
much weaker once we control for fixed
effects. The non-fixed effects models
(which are standard in the research
literature) suggest home bias in a
majority of cases, whereas our preferred
models indicate home bias in only a
minority of cases.
 Second, home bias is much stronger in
the ‘traditional’ sectors of the economy
(such as chemicals and mechanical
engineering) than in more ‘modern’
sectors (such as computing). This is
consistent with the idea that
information diffuses faster
internationally in the modern sectors.
 Finally, and most interestingly, we find
evidence that home bias has declined
over time, being much stronger in the
pre-1990 period than the post-1990
period. We interpret this as suggesting
that information flows more easily
across national boundaries as the cost
of international communication and
travel has fallen.
Don’t bury economic
geography just yet
So the bottom line is that when it comes
to the flow of new ideas, we find hard
evidence that distance has become less
important over time. But for many sectors,
especially in the more traditional and
mature technologies, it is not yet dead. 
One policy implication of this research
is that it makes less sense to subsidise
corporate R&D if the ideas generated
benefit other countries very quickly.
Similarly, firms may worry more that their
innovations may earn them profits for less
time than in the past, as foreign firms
learn to imitate and leapfrog them.
If new ideas benefit 
other countries more 
quickly nowadays, it may 
make less sense to subsidise
corporate R&D
For traditional
sectors with
mature
technologies,
distance is 
not yet dead
This article summarises ‘Is Distance Dying at
Last? Falling Home Bias in Fixed Effects
Models of Patent Citations’ by Rachel Griffith,
Sokbae Lee and John Van Reenen, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 818 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
pubs/download/dp0818.pdf).
Rachel Griffith and Sokbae Lee are 
at University College London.
John Van Reenen is director of CEP.
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Maternal smoking during pregnancy remains prevalent in
many countries despite decades of research testifying to
the harm it imposes on the unborn child. Following the
1998 ‘Smoking Kills’ White Paper, which identified ending
maternal smoking as a target of future UK government
policy, a national telephone helpline was launched to help
pregnant mothers devise strategies for quitting smoking.
But since one in five mothers in the UK still smoke while
pregnant, current policy does not seem to be having a big
impact. To gain a better understanding of how policy can
get its message across more strongly and target pregnant
mothers more effectively, research by Emma Tominey
explores how smoking during pregnancy lowers child
health at birth.
The study confirms that mothers who smoke during
pregnancy will have smaller babies – typically 5.4%
(6.5oz) lighter than other babies. But around half of this
damage is because of ‘unobservable traits’ of the mother
– including other health risks she might take, such as
drinking alcohol, and her nutrition and knowledge of
healthy behaviour.
The research also finds that the lasting harm to babies of
smoking during pregnancy is greatest if the mothers have
a lower level of education. Children born to mothers who
left school at the age of 16 suffer double the harm for
each cigarette smoked. This suggests that the government
must target its anti-smoking policy directly at poorly
educated families.
And it is important to note that women who do smoke in
the early stages of pregnancy should not be written off as
being too late to help. Surprisingly, the research shows
that the harm to the baby is essentially reduced to zero if
the mother quits by month five of the pregnancy. This is
much longer than conventional wisdom and previous
research have suggested.
Possible causes for this finding could either be that the
harm from smoking accumulates during the final months
of pregnancy, or because the mothers who quit smoking
simultaneously reduce their health risks in other ways.
Either way, this tells us that there is more time than we
thought to help the mothers change their behaviour
during pregnancy.
Overall, the research suggests that while stopping mothers
smoking during pregnancy is important, it is only half the
battle. Other studies have shown that the effects of being
born underweight stay with a child throughout its life,
affecting its health, education and earnings potential (see
Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2004, and Black et al, 2007).
This study shows that in order to lower the incidence of
underweight births, stopping a mother from smoking
must be combined with helping her to be healthier in
other areas of her life.
Previous studies have identified a link between smoking
and low birth weight, but none have looked in such depth
at whether the education of the mother can alter this and
how the harm accumulates during pregnancy. Emma
Tominey’s study analyses data on the lives of 6,500
children and their mothers, and goes into exceptional
detail about the mothers’ lifestyle, tracking them from
their child's birth until the age of 42. This proved to be
very important, as not only does the harm vary according
to the mother’s education, but traits of the mother 
that are often unobservable account for around half of
the harm.
The study calls on the government to alter radically its
policy on helping pregnant women quit smoking, in
particular targeting the children of poorly educated
mothers. A much more holistic approach to improving
child health in pregnancy is needed to help thousands of
children break out of the poverty trap.
This article summarises ‘Maternal Smoking During Pregnancy and
Early Child Outcomes’ by Emma Tominey, CEP Discussion Paper 
No. 828 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0828.pdf).
Emma Tominey is an occasional research assistant at CEP.
Further reading
Jere Behrman and Mark Rosenzweig (2004), ‘Returns to Birth Weight’,
Review of Economics and Statistics 86(2): 586-601.
Sandra Black, Paul Devereux and Kjell Salvanes (2007), ‘From the
Cradle to the Labour Market? The Effect of Birth Weight on Adult
Outcomes’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(1): 409-39.
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when international relations
damage international trade
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When public attitudes towards a foreign country turn negative,
what are the effects on trade, and especially trade in firm inputs? 
Guy Michaels and Xiaojia Zhi explore this question using the
deterioration in Americans’ opinions of France following the two
countries’ dispute over the invasion of Iraq – a deterioration so drastic 
that French fries were renamed ‘freedom fries’.
International trade flows may
be sensitive to large changes
in relations and attitudes
When the French government opposed US efforts to
obtain a United Nations mandate to use military force
against Iraq in 2002, the resulting standoff led to a
massive deterioration in Americans’ opinion of France.
Our research uses this episode to track the impact of such
worsening international relations on the business
decisions of firms involved in trade between the two
countries. We find significant effects: worsening attitudes
decreased trade.
According to US polls of public opinion, in February 2002,
83% of Americans viewed France favourably; by March
2003, this proportion had declined to 35%. Even three
years later, in February 2006, the fraction of Americans
with a positive view of the French had recovered only as
far as 57%. 
Very negative attitudes towards France became common
even among affluent, college-educated Americans, so they
were likely to be prevalent among managers. By contrast,
attitudes towards Germany worsened much less and
recovered quite quickly, and attitudes towards Britain, Italy
and Spain changed very little.
The US government also singled out France in particular:
Condoleezza Rice, then the president’s national security
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adviser, was quoted by Reuters in March 2003 telling
associates to ‘punish France, ignore Germany and forgive
Russia’. There were also calls in the media to ban French
products, and the House of Representatives cafeteria
began to serve ‘freedom fries’ instead of French fries.
This shock to relations between France and the US
provides an ideal opportunity to examine the effect of
attitudes on trade. In other circumstances, international
trade may in itself affect attitudes. For example, perceived
gains from trade may motivate the US and China to
improve relations. But at the same time, increased trade
may cause Americans to fear that China threatens their
jobs, worsening attitudes.
But in the case of the United States and France, there are
clear reasons for the worsening attitudes and those
reasons are unrelated to trade. The US-France setting also
avoids the problem that worsening attitudes may be
correlated with increased personal risk; this may be a
problem in other circumstances, where worsening
attitudes may cause risk of war or terrorism. And using
other OECD and eurozone countries as plausible
counterfactuals for France makes it possible to net out the
short-run changes in trade that may have taken place in
the absence of worsening relations.
Our study finds that US imports from France fell by about
15% and US exports to France fell by about 8%
compared with other OECD or eurozone countries. This
decline was due in large part to a fall in France’s share of
the quantity of inputs traded with the United States.
There was a similarly large decline in both US business
trips and tourist visits to France, suggesting that
worsening relations did indeed affect transactions
between firms.
One interesting aspect of this natural experiment is that it
is difficult to rationalise the decline in trade of inputs
using standard arguments of firms choosing inputs that
minimise their costs of production. The attributes of inputs
produced in France and by competing input producers,
and the characteristics of firms’ production processes in
the United States are not likely to have changed in the
short run. This suggests that tastes – and not only simple
cost-minimising calculations – may affect firms’ choice of
inputs. 
These results also suggest that international trade flows
may be sensitive to large changes in relations and
attitudes. We conclude that the effect of attitudes may be
particularly strong where there are strong incentives to
punish a foreign country – as in the case of commodities
used by governments – or where the availability of close
substitutes lowers the cost of changing a firm’s input
suppliers. This result may be especially important for
understanding the robustness of trade flows between
Western countries and other important trade partners.
US imports from France declined
sharply following the two
countries’ standoff over Iraq
This articles summarises ‘Freedom Fries’ by Guy
Michaels and Xiaojia Zhi, CEP Discussion Paper No.
815 (http:/cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0815.pdf).
Guy Michaels is a lecturer in economics at LSE 
and a research associate in CEP’s labour 
markets programme. Xiaojia Zhi is a research
economist at CEP.
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Romesh Vaitilingam: David, you’re an
economist but your lectures on savings
and investment are apparently about
psychology. What is it that you’re thinking
about here?
David Laibson: Well, I am an economist
but I spend a lot of time thinking about
the psychological factors that influence
people’s choices and I’ve titled these
lectures ‘the psychology of savings and
investment’ because I want to contrast the
psychological approach with the
traditional classical economic approach.
When I went to graduate school, we
were taught that everyone was rational
and that they optimised. More recently,
the view has developed that while most of
our economic behaviour is pretty rational
and pretty optimal, we do occasionally
depart from that, and such departures can
be studied, measured and modelled. This
lecture series is about those efforts to
enrich our understanding of economic
behaviour by adding the psychological
components that, in essence, complete
the picture.
RV: So really this is a fairly recent
innovation, bringing these psychological
understandings into economics.
DL: The ‘big bang’ for this field came in
1979, when a very important paper by
Danny Kahneman and Amos Tversky was
published. The paper was about
something called prospect theory – or how
people think about risky outcomes. Had
Amos not died, they both would have
been awarded a Nobel Prize; as it turns
out, Danny received the Nobel Prize in
2002.
But even though the field started in
1979, it had very few followers until the
1990s. There was a period in the
wilderness in the 1980s when there were
just a handful of people actively doing
behavioural economics. Then in the 1990s,
life really got started in terms of more and
more people signing on to this endeavour.
And now it’s an area that has a great deal
of interest, enormous graduate student
interest and a lot of research taking place.
You could almost say that it’s become a
fad.
RV: So tell me a little more about how this
actually developed. For years and years
non-economists have said you guys have
this very peculiar view of human nature.
What was it that suddenly made it
possible to introduce psychology? Was it
something to do with the tools and
techniques that economics had
developed?
DL: I think there were two sets of
developments that happened during the
last 25 years. The first thing was that we
began to find empirical evidence that
contradicted the rational actor model.
Now just to be clear: no economist today
or 50 years ago believes that people are
truly perfectly rational.
What economists have always said is
that the rational actor model is a very
good approximation of how people
behave. It gets things mostly right just like
a map gets things mostly right. A map of
London may miss out the hills and valleys
but it basically tells you how London is laid
out. So just as a map can be useful even if
it’s not perfectly right, so the rational actor
model was always felt to be good enough.
But in the last few decades, more and
more evidence – both experimental
evidence from the laboratory and evidence
from real markets – like financial markets
– has contradicted many of the predictions
of the rational actor model. 
We need a combination of psychology and
economics to understand people’s savings and
investment decisions, according to David
Laibson, who recently delivered the 2007 
Lionel Robbins Memorial Lectures at LSE.
CentrePiece editor Romesh Vaitilingam
interviewed him about his work in the new 
field of behavioural economics.
The psychology of 
savings and investment
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The other set of developments is that
we have developed theoretical frameworks
that enable us to formalise these
departures. We have alternative models
for mathematically representing human
behaviour. These alternatives don’t leave
the rational actor model aside but add to
it and improve it. Now we have the
combination of new data and
supplemental models that are jointly
moving economics forward. 
RV: Tell me about your own research
programme, and particularly how it relates
to one of the great policy challenges,
getting people to save enough to pay for
their old age. What kind of findings are
you coming up with and what lessons can
we learn from them?
DL: There are essentially two kinds of
thinking in my research. The first aims to
understand the foundations of human
preferences and human decision-making.
And the second is to think about how we
can build institutions that help people do
what they want to do.
The underlying psychology is the
psychology of instant gratification. It is the
psychology of a decision-maker in a
household who puts enormous weight on
the present and then drastically discounts
events that might only be a week away in
time. It’s the person who says, I know I
should exercise and I’ll do that next week
but right now these chips look very good.
Or the person who says, I know I should
save and I’m going to start saving very
seriously next month but tonight, how
about a bottle of champagne?
This psychology can be modelled and
measured, and I’ve spent a lot of my
academic career trying to do that. But
then the question arises, if people do put
enormous weight on the present, it might
be awfully hard for them to save. We see
that people say that they care a lot about
the future. They say, look, I’m not going
to save today but I will save tomorrow. I’m
not going to exercise now but I will
exercise later. So it’s not as if we think that
our futures are irrelevant, just that we
By understanding
the psychological
foundations 
of human
decision-making,
we can build
institutions that
help people 
do what they
want to do
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aren’t willing to invest in them right now.
We prefer to make those investments next
month.
So we need to build institutions that
help get us over that hump. And a lot of
the work that I’m doing is trying to figure
out how to create pension plans or
savings systems that help people save for
retirement. These are people who might
not be able to do it on their own but are
thrilled when you make it easier for them
by providing, say, a defined contribution
pension plan. This would be a system, for
example, where you’re a new employee at
a firm and you’re automatically enrolled in
the pension scheme, with some fraction of
your salary deposited every month directly
into a retirement account.
These automatic enrolment plans are
highly effective. People like them and they
don’t opt out of them. They accumulate
large bodies of wealth for retirement. Yet,
if you were to change the system and set
it up so that instead of people being
automatically enrolled they are only given
the option to enrol, you find that very few
people join these plans. It takes years for
the typical person to enrol in a plan
without automatic enrolment.
So we have a situation where our
tendency to procrastinate undermines our
willingness to save. One natural way
around that is to make savings automatic
and when you do that, people are very
satisfied with the net result. A lot of what
I’ll be talking about in these lectures is
describing the underlying psychology of
resisting savings and the institutions that
help people save, which is what they tell
us they want to do anyway. 
RV: So your work is informing policy that
will, in effect, save people from
themselves.
DL: That’s right. But we don’t want to be
too paternalistic. I’m an advocate of giving
people good defaults and always giving
them the option to opt out if they don’t
want to save. I recognise that government
sometimes goes too far and that we don’t
want to tell people how to live their lives.
But I also recognise that left to their own
devices completely, people sometimes
make bad choices.
So we’ve defined the middle ground, a
hybrid system that nudges people in the
right direction, encouraging them to do
things that they view as desirable without
compelling them or coercing them in ways
that are too paternalistic or heavy-handed.
Basically what we want to do is to make
savings easy. If you don’t want to save,
that’s fine, you can opt out of the system.
But if you want to save, which most
people think they should do, then it’s
made simple for you, not difficult and
time-consuming.
RV: Is there also a role for education in
this? Few people seem to have a good
grasp of basic numbers, but can we teach
them to manage their finances more
effectively?
DL: Well, it’s true that people have very
low levels of financial literacy, and some of
the work that I’ve been involved in has
been studying these financial
vulnerabilities in terms of low levels of
education or knowledge about finance.
But if we think that education is an
important piece of the puzzle, we have to
not only document that education is
missing but also show that educating
people leads them to behave in better
ways.
Surprisingly, there’s very little evidence
that supports that kind of policy. It’s not
clear that education programmes can
increase people’s financial literacy and
improve their behaviour in ways that are
cost-effective. While it’s true that if we
gave everyone a PhD in finance, we’d
probably see the world saving much more
correctly and investing more rationally,
that’s an awfully expensive intervention.
Then the question becomes, can we
strip it down and generate much simpler,
cheaper, quicker interventions that get the
job done? And the answer so far is,
maybe not. It doesn’t look like there are
easy educational interventions that train
people to make optimal or nearly optimal
financial decisions.
For example, it’s a good idea to have a
high school curriculum that emphasises
more economic and financial issues. But
even if we did, it might well be the case
that by the time that 18-year-old reaches
48, the world will have changed. And
what she learned in high school may no
longer be that relevant for what she will
have to do as an adult. 
If I had been taught how to save for
retirement when I was in high school, I
would have been taught, find a company
with a good defined benefit pension plan
and work there for the rest of your life.
And that turns out to be terrible advice.
First, all of those plans are being
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terminated. And second, in the job market
of today, you don’t stay at one company
your whole life: you move around and if
you move around, as you should to
advance your career, you’re going to lose
those pension benefits.
So if we think education is important,
we have to first prove that we actually can
cost-effectively educate people and help
them make better choices. I think that
automaticity is a more cost-effective tool
in helping people make good choices.
Rather than spending a lot of time and
energy educating someone, which may or
may not get them to make a better
choice, I know that if I automatically enrol
them in a defined contribution pension
plan with a 5, 6 or 7% savings rate and I
automatically allocate their assets to a life
cycle fund, they’re going to do very well.
And they’re going to basically stick with
this good default. 
So the question is, do I want to spend
thousands of dollars on education for that
person or do I want to automatically enrol
them in the pension plan with the default
savings rate of 7% and the default asset
allocation to a life cycle fund with
relatively low fees. I know the latter
works. It still remains to be shown that the
education works. 
RV: What about the psychology of
investment? How does that fit into your
analysis?
DL: Many of the investment choices that
the typical investor makes are self-
defeating, whether it’s return-chasing,
avoiding risks because of loss aversion or
failing to recognise the importance of fees
in reducing returns. Again and again,
economists are documenting that people
make financial mistakes. We have to
identify those mistakes, understand their
sources and build institutions that help
people avoid them.
So that’s where the investment side
comes in. It’s easy to make bad choices in
financial markets: choosing the wrong
mutual funds, choosing the wrong asset
classes, failing to diversify, failing to hold a
world portfolio and instead just holding a
domestic portfolio. The typical investor
needs help, perhaps through education
and perhaps through defaults, to improve
their balance sheet.
Another issue is employer stock. In the
United States, investors in defined
contribution pension plans often hold an
alarmingly high fraction of their wealth in
the stock of their employer, which is, of
course, putting all their eggs in the same
basket. You don’t want your job to be on
the line and your retirement account to
collapse at the same time, which is what
happened at Enron and many other firms
in the early 2000s.
We’ve got a lot to do in measuring
and then understanding the psychological
underpinnings of this kind of investment
mistake, which will lead us to build better
institutions that help people avoid these
mistakes.
RV: So in terms of these institutions you’re
looking to design, what kind of impact are
your research findings and those of your
colleagues in this field starting to have on
policy-makers? Are these ideas starting to
feed into practice?
DL: The work that my collaborators and I
are doing and the work of many other
economists in this field, have had an effect
on what’s going on in financial markets
and on the regulators both in the United
States and around the world.
In 2006, the United States passed the
Pension Protection Act (PPA), which
basically made defaults the official policy
of the US government. The PPA uses
defaults to help people save in their
retirement accounts. The Department of
Labor recently produced a set of
regulations that establish what is and
what is not an appropriate investment for
these default funds. The UK is about to
initiate its own major policy programme
using defaults. And we’re seeing 
defaults show up in many countries
around the world.
So policy-makers are embracing the
idea that a) investors sometimes make
mistakes and b) institutions that aren’t
that complex or that controversial can
avoid a lot of these problems. And I’m
happy to say that I think the pensions
world of 2010 is going to look a lot
different and a lot more practical and
useful to unsophisticated investors than
the pensions world of 2000.
David Laibson’s Lionel Robbins lectures were
delivered on 19, 20 and 21 November 2007 in
the Old Theatre at LSE. Recordings of the
lectures and slides from the lectures are
available here: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/interviews/
David Laibson is professor of economics 
at Harvard University. More on 
his research can be found here:
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/
faculty/laibson
The pensions
world of 2010 is
going to look a 
lot more useful to
unsophisticated
investors than 
the pensions
world of 2000
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W
age inequality has
increased substantially in
both the United States
and the UK in the last 
30 years. This fact, which is now firmly
established, has fuelled debate about
appropriate policy responses, including
more progressive taxation, education and
training, tougher corporate governance to
control the remuneration of top
management, strengthening unions and
minimum wages, curtailing trade and
beefing up social security. Some critics of
pro-market reforms claim that rising
inequality is evidence that liberalisation
helps the rich at the expense of the
average worker. For others, rising
inequality is used to argue for
programmes to upgrade skills.
But a proper policy response requires
an understanding of what has caused
wage inequality. Much research shows
(see, for example, the summary in Machin
and Van Reenen, 2007) that an important
part of the rise in inequality comes from
increases in inequality among similar
workers – what economists call ‘within-
group’ inequality. This means that workers
with a similar age, gender, skill and
industry group tend to be paid increasingly
dissimilar wages.
Within-group inequality may be driven
by the same factors explaining the broader
distribution of wages between workers.
For example, if technology increases the
payoff to a university education it is also
more likely to increase the wages of more
able graduates more than those of less
able graduates. But the increase in within-
group inequality may be driven by other
factors – such as declining union
membership and the minimum wage
(Goldin and Katz, 2007).
Technology-based theories of within-
group wage inequality share a common
prediction: since workers’ pay is linked to
their productivity, increases in wage
inequality should be accompanied by
increases in ‘productivity dispersion’. In
other words, the productivity distribution
for firms should have widened. 
Our new study looks first at
individuals’ earnings and firms’ average
wages and shows that the increase in
wage dispersion between people is mainly
due to an increase in wage inequality
between firms. In other words, the
internal structure of wages within firms
has not widened as much as the
difference in average wages between firms
(in the same industries). This is an
important finding when looking for the
causes of wage inequality. It suggests that
little of the growth in inequality is the
result of changes in the way firms treat
their own workers.
Hundreds of papers have documented
a close correlation between firms’ average
wages and firms’ average productivity
Many blame globalisation for growing wage
inequality in the UK. But according to 
research by Giulia Faggio, Kjell Salvanes and
John Van Reenen, the rise in inequality is
better explained by increasing dispersion in 
the productivity of firms related to their use of
new technology.
Inequality of
individual wages
and the dispersion 
of firm productivity
beginning with the pioneering work 
of ex-Monetary Policy Committee
members Sushil Wadhwani and Steve
Nickell in the 1980s at the CEP (see, for
example, the summary in Layard et al,
2005). We also find that this relationship
persists and has grown stronger,
suggesting that firms’ characteristics are
important in understanding the evolution
of wage inequality. 
To test the link between productivity
and inequality, our research looks at
changes in firm productivity, mainly
measured by value added per worker, over
time. We focus on the differences
between high- and low-productivity firms
among representative samples of
hundreds of thousands of British firms.
Previous research has studied the
manufacturing sector (Dunne et al, 2004;
Haskel and Martin, 2002), but we analyse
both the manufacturing and service
sectors of the UK economy since the two
sectors have experienced very different
trends. In particular, the manufacturing
sector has been in rapid decline, which
means that the least productive firms 
are disappearing from view, compressing
the observed distribution. Consistent 
with this fact, productivity inequality has
risen much faster in services than in 
the manufacturing sector since the 
early 1980s.
It is well-known and entirely
understandable that different firms have
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Figure 1:
Productivity dispersion in the UK economy, 1984-2001
Much of the rise in wage
inequality is driven by
increasing differences in
wages among firms in the
same industry 
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Note: Productivity is defined as the log of value added per worker. Values are indexed to be 
1 in 1984, so the lines show the growth in productivity at different parts of the distribution.
The upper line is at the 90th percentile, the middle line is the median and the bottom line is at
the 10th percentile.
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comparisons are useful because when
‘general-purpose technologies’ such as ICT
become ubiquitous, the impact on firms is
felt worldwide. Cross-country comparisons
make it possible to distinguish general
effects from changes specific to the UK. 
In terms of policy, our findings suggest
that the causes of rising inequality are
primarily structural and related to new
technology rather than to trade or
institutions. Thus, contrary to what some
have argued, greater trade protectionism
or the re-energising of unions may do
relatively little to reverse the increase 
in inequality.
A better strategy would be to
concentrate on raising the skill and
education levels of the workforce,
particularly of those at the bottom 
of the ability distribution. This means 
not just improving the quantity of
schooling for disadvantaged groups, 
but increasing the quality of school and
pre-school education.
different productivity levels. Some firms
are better managed and use better
technology than other firms. But an
original finding of our work is that this
productivity gap between firms has
widened. We look at two groups of firms
from opposite ends of the productivity
distribution: one at the top (90th
percentile) and one at the bottom 
(10th percentile).
So productivity inequality rose
substantially over the period (see Figure 1).
Between 1984 and 2001, productivity in
our sample rose by about 49% (40 log
points) for the median firm. But for firms
near the bottom (the 10th percentile)
there was a rise in productivity of only
22% (20 log points) whereas for firms
near the top (90th percentile) productivity
has risen by about 82% (60 log points). 
Our research shows that changes in
labour productivity are mainly driven by
changes in ‘total factor productivity’,
rather than changes in the amount of
buildings or old capital equipment used.
These results suggest that technological
differences among firms may be the
underlying cause of increasing dispersion.
Using data on the use of information and
communication technologies (ICT), we
show that productivity dispersion rose
most strongly in sectors where ICT use
grew most rapidly and intensively. 
The rise in productivity dispersion did 
not seem closely related to imports or to
trade unions.
Finally, we also document a rise in
productivity dispersion in France and
Norway in the 1990s, although the rise
was smaller than in the UK. Such
This article summarises ‘The Evolution 
of Inequality in Productivity and Wages:
Panel Data Evidence’ by Giulia Faggio,
Kjell Salvanes and John Van Reenen,
CEP Discussion Paper No. 821
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0821.pdf).
Giulia Faggio is an economist at Citigroup
Inc. in London and a CEP research associate.
Kjell Salvanes is at the Norwegian School of
Economics and Business Administration.
John Van Reenen is director of CEP.
Further reading
Timothy Dunne, Lucia Foster, John
Haltiwanger and Kenneth Troske (2004),
‘Wage and Productivity Dispersion in US
Manufacturing: The Role of Computer
Investments’, Journal of Labor Economics
22(2): 397-429.
Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz (2007),
‘Long-run Changes in the US Wage Structure:
Narrowing, Widening, Polarizing’, National
Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper No. 13568.
Jonathan Haskel and Ralf Martin (2002),
‘The UK Manufacturing Productivity Spread’,
Ceriba Working Paper
(http://www.ceriba.org.uk).
Richard Layard, Stephen Nickell and Richard
Jackman (2005), Unemployment:
Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour
Market, Oxford University Press.
Stephen Machin and John Van Reenen (2007),
‘Changes in Wage Inequality’, CEP Special
Paper No. 18, forthcoming in The New
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/special/
cepsp18.pdf).
The increase in
the productivity
dispersion of firms
is mainly in
services, especially
in sectors where
ICT use grew 
most rapidly 
and intensively
A major source of
rising inequality is
greater dispersion in
firms’ productivity
related to their use
of new technology
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D
uring the past ten years there
has been a significant increase
in the number of individuals
coming to live and work in
the UK. By 2007, 12.5% of the working
age population had been 
born overseas, up from 8.5% at the end of
the last recession in 1993 and 7% in the
mid-1970s.
The addition to the UK labour force
over this period caused by the rise in the
number of working age immigrants from
2.3 to 4.2 million is about the same as
that stemming from the increase in the
native-born working age population
caused by the baby boom generation
reaching adulthood. The relative rise 
in immigrant numbers in recent years 
has been greater among those with 
higher levels of educational attainment
(See Figure 1).
These trends have stimulated a heated
debate about the effects of immigration, a
debate that has taken on renewed vigour
following the wave of immigration from
the countries that have recently joined the
European Union and following evidence of
a loosening of the UK labour market.
Yet, despite immigration being at the
forefront of the political debate, research-
based evidence on its effects on the
labour market is far from conclusive. The
largest body of evidence comes from the
United States, where researchers have
reached different conclusions. In a number
of papers, David Card at Berkeley finds
little discernible impact of immigration on
the wages of native-born workers, while
George Borjas at Harvard argues that
immigration has a pronounced effect on
the native wage structure.
Evidence for the UK is scant and we
should not automatically assume that the
impact of immigration will be similar to
that found in the United States. The most
convincing study – by Christian Dustmann
and colleagues – finds that immigration
has no large discernible effect on the level
of native wages.
At first glance, this finding is puzzling
since simple economic reasoning and
perhaps popular belief suggest that a
large increase in labour supply – such as
the one brought about by immigration –
should lower the wages and/or
What are the effects of increased immigration
on the wages and employment of people who
are already here, whether they are native-
born or earlier immigrants? Research by
Marco Manacorda, Alan Manning and
Jonathan Wadsworth investigates.
The labour market effects
of immigration
Figure 1:
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The main labour market impact of
increased immigration to the UK is felt
by immigrants who are already here
Table 1:
Male immigrants and native-born workers in Britain
(five year averages)
1975 1985 1995 2005
Percentage share of university graduates among:
Native-born 6.0% 12.2% 15.4% 21.6%
Immigrants 9.9% 22.7% 32.9% 40.4%
Percentage wage gap between university graduates and school leavers among:
Native-born 12.3% 12.2% 16.4% 24.4%
Immigrants 25.7% 24.3% 29.6% 29.9%
employment of workers in the recipient
country. But this conclusion is based on
the often unspoken assumption that
natives and migrants are highly
substitutable in production – that an
employer can easily replace a native-born
worker with an equally skilled migrant
worker. This need not to be the case and
it is therefore a matter for empirical
verification.
A simple test of the degree of
substitutability between these different
production inputs is the responsiveness of
the wage differential between native and
migrant workers with any given level of
skill to labour force changes brought
about by migration. The intuition behind
this test is that if natives and migrants are
perfectly substitutable in production, we
would expect their wages to respond
similarly to changes in labour supply, be it
from natives or migrants, leaving the
differential unaffected,
Conversely, if we find that the native-
migrant wage differential is sensitive to
the share of migrants in the population,
and in particular if this differential
increases as migration rises, this will be
evidence of imperfect substitutability,
potentially explaining why natives appear
to suffer few losses from migration.
To do this, our study focuses on men’s
labour market outcomes using micro-data
spanning the period from the late 1970s
to the mid-2000s. Because it is well
known that workers with different labour
market experience and skills are imperfect
substitutes in production, we decompose
the labour force into different groups
defined by age and education in addition
to migration status. We estimate the
trends in immigration along these
dimensions as well as the correlation
between these trends and the wages and
employment of natives and previous
migrants. 
Measuring migrants’ skills is not an
easy task with UK data since the definition
of qualifications varies between natives
and migrants, with large numbers of
migrants being classified in official surveys
as holding unspecified ‘other
qualifications’. To cut through this
problem, we measure completed
education in terms of the age at which
the individual left full-time education.
According to this metric, over the three
decades of analysis, migrants have been
on average more skilled than natives and
increasingly so.
This is shown in Table 1. The relative
supply of skilled to less skilled labour has
grown more among immigrants. At the
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same time, the returns to education have
risen faster for natives. A way to
rationalise this is that the returns to
education among each of these groups
respond to their own relative supply,
implying imperfect substitutability.
Our estimates indicate that a 10% rise
in the share of immigrants in the UK
population is associated with an increase
in the native-migrant wage differential of
around 1.9%. We take this as evidence
that migrants and natives are imperfect
substitutes in production. 
This finding is highly robust and
squares well with our other finding that
the extent of occupational segregation
between migrants and natives in the UK
labour market is sizeable. We show that
between 20% and 34% of immigrants
would have to change jobs to match the
occupational distribution of employment
among natives. 
Interestingly, we find that migration
particularly affects wage differentials
between natives and recent migrants as
well as those who migrated in adulthood.
It appears that newly arrived migrants bear
disproportionately the cost of new
migration inflows. This cost manifests itself
in terms of lower wages rather than
employment losses.
We use these estimates to determine
the effect of increased immigration on the
level of native wages. Our calculations
show that this effect is negligible. This
result depends on the imperfect
substitutability between migrants and
natives coupled with the fact that
migrants still account for a relatively low
share of the workforce.
Our conclusion does not imply that
immigration to the UK has no costs, but
rather that the effects on groups other
than immigrants themselves has been, on
average, small. 
As a caveat to our conclusion, recall
that most of the changes in the labour
force brought about by immigration over
the three decades of our analysis are due
to the inflow of skilled migrants. Because
of this, our study is unable to shed much
light on what appears to have been a
recent increase in unskilled migration. This
inflow might have rather different effects
on the wage and employment structure of
natives than the one estimated in our
research.
Indeed our analysis shows that
unskilled natives are relatively more
substitutable with respect to migrants
than skilled natives, although differences
between the two groups are not
statistically significant. More data and
longer time series are needed to estimate
this effect precisely. 
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of London and a senior research fellow in
CEP’s labour markets programme.
Newly arrived migrants
bear disproportionately
the cost of increased
migration in terms of
lower wages
generation, you need the lifetime income
of parents and children, a panel of at least
40 years. To measure mobility over two
generations, you need lifetime income
data for children, parents and
grandparents – a minimum of a 70-year
panel.
Even when the data are available, it is
almost impossible to make comparisons
across countries or over time. So we know
very little about intergenerational mobility
– whether it has risen or fallen over time;
whether it is larger in the United States,
the UK or continental Europe; or whether
it is more prevalent in growing or stagnant
societies, in richer or poorer societies or in
societies where inequality is high or low.
Our research offers a new way of
measuring intergenerational mobility that
escapes from the slavery of panel data.
Instead, our method measures the
informational content of surnames: the
more information a surname reveals about
the economic welfare of its bearer, the
more that inheritance determines people’s
economic outcomes. In other words, the
more a surname tells us about the
wellbeing of an individual, the less
intergenerational mobility there is in 
that society.
The data requirements of this method
are infinitely less demanding than the
traditional method for measuring mobility,
as we use census data (a cross-section of
surnames as well as measures of income
and education), which are collected in
most countries. And by studying the
informational content of surnames, it is
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A
lmost all children get their
surname from their
parents. While it is
unlikely that a specific
surname has much effect
on its bearer’s wellbeing, surnames are
inherited together with other things that
actually do affect a child’s future life –
such as genes, wealth, beauty and
education. Surnames can therefore
provide us with information about the
wellbeing of individuals, not because they
matter in themselves but because they
travel across generations with things that
do matter.
In this way, surnames offer a potential
source of data for tracking the importance
of family background for outcomes in later
life and the degree to which people’s
economic and social status changes
between generations. Surname data can
show us how this ‘intergenerational
mobility’ compares across countries and
how it evolves over time.
It is notoriously difficult to measure
the probability that the child of poor
parents will become rich, and vice versa.
This is because the traditional procedure
(comparing the lifetime income of parents
with that of their children) demands very
long panels of data, which are hard to
obtain. To measure mobility within one
It is very difficult to measure changes in
economic and social mobility across generations
and to make comparisons across societies.
Research by Maia Güell, José V. Rodríguez
Mora and Chris Telmer finds that surnames
can provide valuable insights into the
importance of family background for people’s
outcomes in later life.
What’s in a name?
Information on intergenerational mobility
SáGil de B
mating is that surnames are inherited only
from the father, but background depends
on both parents. An increase in assortative
mating – so that people are more likely to
marry someone from a similar family
background to themselves – results in a
decrease in mobility and an increase in the
informational content of surnames.
Surnames are not only informative
about the family to which an individual
belongs, but also about his or her
ethnicity. Not controlling for ethnicity
would bias the results, as the
informational content of surnames might
reflect ethnicity in addition to specific
family background. Fortunately, we can
use the surnames themselves to control
for ethnicity.
The second stage of our analysis is to
test the methodology against some data.
We use data from Catalonia, where the
Spanish naming convention comes in
handy: individuals have two surnames (the
first from the father and the second from
the mother); they pass only the first of
these to their children (the standard
western tradition of inheriting the paternal
easier to measure changes in mobility over
time since every census contains all the
relevant information for many generations.
We can assess how mobility evolves over
time by comparing the informational
content of surnames among older and
younger cohorts. 
In the first stage of our analysis, we
develop a methodology for measuring the
degree of intergenerational mobility since
it is not immediately obvious why
surnames should be informative or that
the amount of information they contain
reveals the degree of intergenerational
mobility. Imagine that there are very few
surnames, each shared by many
individuals who are not necessarily related.
In this case, surnames would not be
informative, since they would not indicate
family linkages. For example, two
individuals called Smith are very unlikely to
be related, which makes any similarity
between their incomes a product of
chance and unrelated to the degree of
inheritance. 
Fortunately, the distribution of
surnames is extremely skewed. In other
words, there are some very common
surnames (their bearers unlikely to be
related), but the huge majority of
surnames are quite infrequent, accounting
for a very large fraction of the population.
Two bearers of an uncommon surname
are likely to be related. Uncommon
surnames are central to our method,
because income similarities between
individuals linked by an infrequent
surname indicate the significance of
background for economic outcomes.
The reason for this skewness is that
the process of generation and inheritance
of surnames is akin to the genetic process
that determines the distribution of DNA.
Surnames (lineages) die when the last
male bearer of a surname dies without a
male descendant (as surnames are
inherited via the male line in most western
societies). Lineages are born whenever a
person changes his surname or an
immigrant arrives carrying a distinct
surname. 
Our research develops a ‘genetic’
model of the joint distribution of
surnames and income. It shows that by
looking at the informational content of
surnames, we can infer the importance of
background. Extensions of the model
allow for the possibility of ‘assortative
mating’ (in which ‘like marry like’) and the
introduction of ethnic differences in
income (due to discrimination or any other
reasons). 
The rationale for including assortative
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The more a surname tells us about
the wellbeing of an individual, the
less intergenerational mobility
there is in that society
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surname); and women never change their
surname when they get married.
Thus it is possible to identify family
background through the first surname and
ethnicity through the second surname.
Our measure of the informational content
of surnames captures how much first
surnames explain the variation in
individuals’ outcomes beyond ethnicity
and individual observable characteristics
(gender, place of birth, etc.). We find that
this is sizeable and, consistent with the
model, larger when we focus on
infrequent surnames, as these provide a
closer approximation to family.
The combination of the two surnames
also allows us to identify siblings (as two
individuals who share two infrequent
surnames in the same order are almost
certainly siblings) and to determine the
degree of assortative mating among the
parents (how much the surname of the
father helps to explain the surname of the
mother).
Our analysis of the data shows that in
Catalonia surnames are informative in a
way that is perfectly coherent with the
predictions of the model. Surnames
contain information about both ethnicity
(individuals with Catalan surnames do
better) and family background.
Furthermore, the amount of information
that surnames contain has increased
steadily over time, indicating a decrease 
in mobility.
One way to validate these results (and
the methodology) is to identify siblings by
using the two surnames. Doing this reveals
that the correlation between siblings has
increased over time, which also indicates
decreased mobility. Moreover, this decrease
in mobility is explained by an increase in
assortative mating that predates the
increase in the informational content of
surnames by one generation.
There are two readings of our results.
The first is literal: despite dramatic
increases in the provision of public
education in modern Spain, the degree of
intergenerational mobility has decreased.
This fall in mobility is a consequence of
assortative mating. 
Second, surnames enable us to look at
the relevance of family background. This
view is strongly reinforced by the fact that
the results are identical whether using only
one surname (for countries other than
Spain) or using two and concentrating on
siblings. Thus, the methodology is strongly
supported by the results. We can learn a
lot by looking at how much surnames say.
This article summarises ‘Intergenerational
Mobility and the Informative Content of
Surnames’ by Maia Güell, José V. Rodríguez
Mora and Chris Telmer, CEP Discussion
Paper No. 810 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/dp0810.pdf).
Maia Güell is professor of economics at the
University of Edinburgh and a research
associate in CEP’s labour markets
programme. José V. Rodríguez Mora is
professor of economics at the University of
Edinburgh. Chris Telmer is an associate
professor at Carnegie-Mellon University.
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that surnames
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a decrease 
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Do computers help 
police fight crime?
The adoption of information technology by police
departments in the United States is a relatively recent
phenomenon. Before 1987, less than 2% of the 2,200 US
police departments with fewer than 100 employees used
computers. And as recently as 2003, only 40% of police
departments had mobile computer terminals.
So did police departments that adopted information
technology earliest see changes in organisational practices
and drops in crime relative to those that adopted later?
Our research addresses this question by comparing the
crime-fighting effectiveness and organisational practices of
police departments that were early adopters to those that
adopted the technology less rapidly (factoring out
demographic and other changes, as well as time trends
and department-specific effects).
We use two data sources: first, the triennial Law
Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics
(LEMAS) surveys, which document US police departments’
use of technology between 1987 and 2003; and second,
the FBI’s uniform crime reports, which collect crime and
arrest statistics for the entire country. We also use
demographic data from the US censuses to control for
population characteristics.
We find that the departments that adopted information
technology grew in size by around 8%, increasing the
number of specialised jobs and share of support staff
needed as well as the use of written (as opposed to oral)
instructions within the department. These departments
also increased the educational standards for new officers
by raising both the college requirements and their hours
of training by around 200 hours. The increase in training
hours appears to be mostly related to the use of mobile
terminals. 
Thus, the greater use of computers by police departments
implies a larger, increasingly complex and more highly
educated police force. This outcome is not too surprising.
Where our results are puzzling is when we turn to the
productivity gains related to this technological revolution.
We measure productivity in two ways: first, crime
clearance rates (crimes solved relative to crimes
committed); and second, offence rates (crimes per head of
population). Surprisingly, we find that the use of
information technology neither increased crime clearance
rates nor decreased offence rates. In fact, if anything, the
use of computers is associated with an increase in
property crimes. This is a puzzling set of results,
particularly given our finding that the use of technology
raises the quality of police staff. 
So is there some causal link between these results? Our
empirical strategy suggests that the answer is yes, given
that the results control for geographical and department-
specific characteristics as well as time trends. Of course, as
Does the increasing computerisation of police work result 
in more effective crime-fighting? Paul Heaton and Luis
Garicano study the impact of information technology on the
organisation and productivity of US police departments.
Computers
increase the
effectiveness of
police work – 
but only if it is
reorganised to 
take advantage of
their presence
in brief...
n
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always in social science, it is hard to prove causality
unequivocally. To increase our confidence in the findings,
we study several alternative hypotheses: 
 First, it is not simply the case that the more troubled
police departments are the ones that adopted
information technology faster (which would yield a
spurious link between high investment in information
technology and small changes in clearance rates).
 Second, it is not the case that future levels of
information technology use are connected to changes
in organisation and productivity, as would be expected
if information technology were the result, rather than
the cause, of the changes studied.
 Third, the results for productivity are unrelated to city
size or population growth or decline: they hold across
the board for growing and shrinking cities and police
departments.
 Fourth, controlling for the size of a department’s
budget does not alter the result, suggesting that it is
not the outcome of growing or shrinking budgets.
 Finally, we use the adoption of information technology
by state as a plausible ‘exogenous’ source of variation
for the rate of adoption by police departments, and
show that the results are still unchanged. 
All of this suggests that the conclusion is causal and raises
an important question about whether technology really
does help police departments and, if so, how. 
One key advantage of computers is improved record-
keeping. Our research shows that introducing computers
for record-keeping did increase the amount of recorded
‘minor crimes’ such as larceny, accounting for some, 
but not all, of the measured ineffectiveness of
computers. As would be expected, improved record-
keeping did not affect the number of homicides and
major crimes recorded. This supplies an explanation for
part of the puzzle. 
We develop the hypothesis that just as in the private
sector, it is not only the increased use of computers that is
required for better outcomes, but also changes in the
organisation of police work. In the context of policing, the
organisation of work around computers might change by
the use of geographical patterns to allocate resources and
to measure the crime-fighting progress of individual
officers.
The best-known example of this use of information
technology is the New York City Police Department’s
CompStat system, associated with Bill Bratton’s tenure as
police chief during the 1990s under then-Mayor Rudy
Giuliani. CompStat is an integrated information and
management system for policing, which includes several
key elements that the LEMAS data capture: data-driven
problem identification, internal accountability,
geographical organisation of deployment, and measurable
goals.
Our research finds that police departments that adopted
computers together with CompStat-style organisational
practices did experience reduced property and violent
crime and significantly increased crime clearance rates (by
around 8%). Thus, we conclude that computers do
increase the effectiveness of police work, but only if police
work is substantially reorganised to take advantage of
their presence. 
Computers plus an integrated
information and management
system for policing increase
crime clearance rates
This article summarises ‘Information Technology, Organisation
and Productivity in the Public Sector: Evidence from Police
Departments’ by Luis Garicano and Paul Heaton, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 826 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/dp0826.pdf).
Luis Garicano is director of research in LSE’s department of
management, professor of economics and strategy at the
University of Chicago’s graduate school of business, and a
research associate in CEP’s research programme on
productivity and innovation. Paul Heaton is an associate
economist at the RAND Corporation.
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